Cameleering / Security and supply chain
Cameleering · security
Security and supply chain: what you can check, and what is not done yet
What a security or procurement review of Cameleer or simoom needs: the licence, what is in a build, how images are built and attested, how to report a vulnerability, and the honest list of what has not been done.
| question | answer |
|---|---|
| Licence | Apache License 2.0, every project, no closed parts. |
| Third-party dependencies | None. Cameleer and simoom are written on the Rust standard library only: TLS, X.509, HTTP/2, HTTP/3, the protocol clients and the parsers are their own code. CI fails Cameleer's build if any third-party crate appears in its SBOM. |
| What is in a build | A CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM of exactly what a build compiles in, generated from cargo tree (scripts/sbom.py) and checked in CI. |
| Container images | cameleering/cameleer on Docker Hub and ghcr.io/cameleering/cameleer: an SBOM, max-mode build provenance and a GitHub attestation on every push. Verify with gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/cameleering/cameleer:latest --owner cameleering (deployment guide). |
| TLS | simoom: certificate verification cannot be turned off. Cameleer: TLS 1.3 and 1.2 with X.509 path validation; the policy for its options is in the TLS and security guide. |
| Unsafe code | simoom: every crate except simoom-sys is #![forbid(unsafe_code)]. |
| Reporting a vulnerability | Privately, through GitHub's vulnerability reporting on the affected repository, never in a public issue. The policy is in SECURITY.md. |
Not done yet
- No independent security audit of the from-scratch cryptography and protocol code (TLS state machine, X.509 path validation, SSH, XML security) has been done. It is planned, along with fuzzing of the parsers.
- Signed release archives (each with a SHA-256 checksum, an SBOM and a keyless cosign signature) arrive with the next release; 0.6.0 ships as images and crates only.
- Both projects are pre-1.0 and maintained by one person. Fixes go to the
mainbranch.
Confidential computing (attestation of what a Cameleer process runs) is a Cameleer feature: confidential integrations.
Common questions
Has the cryptography been audited?
Not yet. The from-scratch TLS, X.509, SSH and XML security code has had no independent audit; one is planned, along with fuzzing of the parsers. The projects publish this openly so a reviewer can weigh it.
How do I report a vulnerability?
Privately through GitHub's vulnerability reporting on the affected repository, not in a public issue.